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ARTICLES
DEBT INVESTMENTS IN COMPETITORS UNDER
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
Hanno F. Kaiser*

INTRODUCTION

When a firm extends credit to a competitor, or a bank or an
investment fund holds debt in two or more competing firms, the
question arises whether these investments are likely to substantially
lessen competition or unreasonably restrain trade. Conceivably, the
lender could exploit its contractual position to exercise control over the
borrower and/or to gain access to the borrower's confidential
information. In addition, holding a financial interest in the debtor might
create an incentive for the creditor to unilaterally raise prices following
the investment or enable the creditor, the debtor, and other firms in the
industry to engage in coordinated interaction that harms consumers.
This Article examines whether debt investments are, in fact, likely
to produce meaningful anticompetitive effects of that nature.' Taking
comparable minority equity investments as a benchmark, the answer is
mostly negative. Unlike partial ownership, debt investments do not
significantly reduce the investor's incentives to compete and are largely

"Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP, New York. The views expressed in this article
are
those of the author and do not purport to reflect the views of Latham & Watkins LLP.
The author can be reached at: hfk@mac.com. The author would like to thank Bruce
Prager, Su Sun, and David Barnes for their helpful comments.
I. Surprisingly, there is very little case law, agency practice, or legal scholarship
addressing the competitive effects of debt investments as such. If debt investments are

discussed at all, they usually appear as an afterthought to the analysis of partial
ownership.
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ineffectual as commitment devices. With respect to corporate control
and information exchange, the answer depends on the financial
condition of the target. As long as the borrower is solvent (and, as a
consequence, has viable refinancing options), the creditor's influence
will generally not be meaningful. However, once the creditor can
accelerate the loan and thereby cause the borrower's bankruptcy, the
creditor's de facto influence over the target increases significantly and
may even exceed the influence conferred by comparable equity
investments (unless the creditor eliminates competitive concerns by
making its debt investment passive). Based on these findings, this
Article recommends deferential treatment of most debt investments in
competitors under the federal antitrust laws. Unless the investment has
certain clearly defined features that permit an inference of probable
competitive harm and the creditor refuses to eliminate such concerns,
debt investments are presumably efficient.
The discussion below is organized as follows: Part I outlines a
framework of analysis that has successfully been applied to equity
investments. Part II extends the equity framework to the competitive
analysis of debt investments, with a special focus on the use of debt as a
commitment device to enable collusion. Part III discusses the treatment
of debt investments by the courts. Part IV summarizes the key findings
and concludes with policy recommendations.
I.

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PARTIAL OWNERSHIP

In a typical minority investment case, company A acquires a noncontrolling equity stake in its competitor, company B. That acquisition
may be challenged under §7 of the Clayton Act ("§7"), which applies to
the acquisition of any part of the stock or the assets of a company.3 In
2. The terms "minority equity investment," "equity investment," and "partial
ownership" are used interchangeably, as are "creditor," "lender," and "debt investor"
and "debtor," "borrower," and "target."
3.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2004). Section 7 applies to partial ownership even if the
acquirer does not obtain control over the target. See, e.g., Denver & Rio Grande W.
RR. Co. v. U.S., 387 U.S. 485, 501 (1967) ("A company need not acquire control of
another company in order to violate [§7]."); U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957) ("[A]ny acquisition of all or any part of the stock of another
corporation, competitor or not, is within the reach of [§7] whenever the reasonable
likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint of commerce or in the
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assessing whether the acquisition is likely to substantially lessen
competition, courts and agencies have focused on the target,
specifically, whether post-acquisition, A would be able to exercise
control over B's competitive decisions; and/or whether A would gain
access to B's confidential business information.4 Only recently has there
been an increased emphasis on how investments in a competitor might
change the competitive behavior of the investor.5
creation of a monopoly of any line of commerce."). Challenges under §7 have
frequently been accompanied by claims of violations of § § 1-2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2004) [hereinafter §§1, 2]. This Article does not focus on monopolization
offenses involving debt.
4. See, e.g., du Pont, 353 U.S. at 602-03, 607 (stating that 23% stock acquisition
violates §7 where acquirer had gained influence over the target, a customer, and was
receiving information from the target); F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons,
Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d. Cir. 1979) (stating that acquisition of 29% of competitor's
stock violates §7 as acquirer would have obtained power to designate directors, gained
access to sensitive information, and discouraged the target's management); Briggs Mfg.
Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, 180-82, 184 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (stating that §7
includes within its scope a percentage interest sufficient to elect nominees to the board
of directors who could influence the competitive decisions of the target and divulge
information to the acquirer); Am. Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-Am. Sugar Co., 259 F.2d
524, 526, 531 (2d Cir. 1958) (stating that 23% stock acquisition violates §7 where
acquirer was seeking to control the target); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
114 F. Supp. 307, 313, 317 (D.Conn. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) (stating
that acquisition of 24% of competitor's stock with the intent to obtain board
representation violates §7). Numerous agency challenges have focused on the corporate
control and information exchange aspects of partial ownership. See, e.g., U.S. v. AT&T
Corp., Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,
584 (D.O.J. June 21, 2000); U.S. v. The Gillette Co., 1990 WL 126485 (D.D.C. July 25,
1990) [hereinafter Gillette I]; U.S. v. The Gillette Co., Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,567 (D.O.J. Apr. 4, 1990); U.S. v. The
Gillette Co., Public Comments and Response, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,312 (D.O.J. July 10,
1990) [hereinafter Gillette /];U.S. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., Proposed Final Judgment
and Competitive Impact Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,314 (D.O.J. Apr. 4, 1980);
Medtronic, Inc., Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 63 Fed. Reg. 53,919 (F.T.C. Oct. 7,
1998); Shell Oil Co., Texaco Inc., Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 62 Fed. Reg.
67,868 (F.T.C. Dec. 30, 1997); Time Warner, Inc., Proposed Consent Agreement with
Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,301 (F.T.C. Sept. 25, 1996).
5. The following consent orders have focused on changes in the financial
incentives of the investor. U.S. v. AT&T Corp., Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 2506 (D.O.J. Jan. 14, 1999); U.S. v. US
West, Inc., Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 61 Fed. Reg.
58,703 (D.O.J. Nov. 18, 1996); In the Matter of Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C.
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A. Effects on the Target
The theories of anticompetitive harm from acquiring corporate
control and information access are straightforward. As a shareholder, A
can sabotage the target through strategic voting at the shareholder
meetings, designation of hostile directors, shareholder lawsuits (the costs
of which would be borne mainly by the other shareholders), abusive
information requests, etc.6 The significance of A's influence depends,
among other things, on the size of its stake in B in absolute terms and
relative to the other shareholders; the concentration of the market; and
whether B is a private or a public company. As a practical matter,
passive investments of less than 15% have rarely been challenged in
court, whereas shareholdings sufficient to designate at least one director
have been subject to intense litigation under both the federal antitrust
laws and state corporation laws. The shareholder/director threshold not
only is of obvious importance for the exercise of corporate control but
also changes the nature of the investor's access to sensitive information
of the target.
A shareholder has a common law right, based on its beneficial
ownership of corporate assets, to inspect "the books of his corporation at
63 (1971), modified in other respects, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972). For a
comprehensive analysis of the unilateral effects of partial ownership, see Daniel P.
O'Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial
Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000) [hereinafter O'Brien &
Salop, Competitive Effects]; Jon B. Dubrow, Challenging the Economic Incentives
Analysis of Competitive Effects in Acquisitions of PassiveMinority Equity Interests, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 113 (2001); Daniel P. O'Brien & Steven C. Salop, The Competitive
Effects of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 611 (2001)
[hereinafter O'Brien & Salop, Competitive Effects: Reply]; David Reitman, Partial
Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 313
(1994); Wilson A. Alley, Partial Ownership Arrangements and Collusion in the
Automobile Industry, 45 J. INDUS. ECoN.191 (1997).
For a discussion of the
coordinated effects of passive equity investments among competitors, see David Gilo,
The Anticompetitive Effect of PassiveInvestment, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2000).
6.
O'Brien & Salop, Competitive Effects: Reply, supra note 5, at 613.
Alternatively, A could use its inside position to organize a cartel. Cross investments are
particularly useful as facilitating devices. Where the creditor has significant market
power, abusive conduct may constitute (attempted) monopolization in violation of §2.
7. The shareholder/director distinction is also reflected in §8 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 19 (2004), prohibiting simultaneous service as a director or officer of
competing companies.
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a proper time and place and for a proper purpose."' The scope of the
shareholder's inspection right is broad and encompasses the list of

shareholders, board minutes, financial records, sales journals, invoices,
contracts, correspondence, sales projections and business plans.9 The
main qualification of the right to access is the good faith or proper

purpose requirement, pursuant to which the company may deny a
request for access if the shareholder's purposes are either unrelated to its
interest as an investor or inimical to the corporation. Among the
improper purposes are harassment, blackmail, and the aid of a
competitor.'0 With respect to the latter, the mere fact that a shareholder

is a competitor (or a shareholder of a competitor) does not defeat the
right to information access," even though it may limit the scope of, or
require the imposition of conditions upon, the inspection. 2 Only where
the shareholder's primary purpose is to obtain competitively sensitive

information to harm the corporation and to aid a competitor may the
company deny access to its books and records. 13 The shareholder may
enforce its information right through the state courts (traditionally by

8. Lau v. DSI Enter., Inc., 477 N.Y.S.2d. 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Most states
also provide the shareholder with statutory inspection rights. The shareholder may
inspect the books in person and with the help of his or her agents. JAMES D. Cox ET AL.,
ON CORPORATIONS § 13.05 (2d. Ed. 2003).
9. Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 538 P.2d 353 (Or. 1975); Kortfim v. Webasto
Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 117 n.8 (Del. Ch. 2000). To ensure the company's
interest in protecting highly sensitive information (e.g., trade secrets), courts have been
willing to grant limited protective orders excluding specific items from review and
placing narrowly tailored non-disclosure obligations on the shareholder. Id. at 13.
10.
For an overview of proper and improper purposes, see COX, supra note 8, at
§ 13.03. Once the shareholder seeks to enforce his or her right in court, the burden of
showing improper motives generally falls upon the corporation. Crane Co. v. Anaconda
Co., 382 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711 (N.Y. 1976); Indianapolis Street Railway Company v.
Cohen, 181 N.E. 365, 368 (Ind. 1932).
11.
Skoglund v. Ormand Indus., Inc., 372 A.2d 204, 212 (Del. Ch. 1976) ("[If]
misuse of the information obtained threatens harm to the corporation, it has a remedy in
the courts in an appropriate action.").
12. Kortim, 769 A.2d at 11.
13. If the disclosure of sensitive information is incidental to an otherwise proper
purpose, the request for information must be granted. Skoglund, 372 A.2d at 207 ("If a
proper purpose is established, it is no defense that the stockholder may also have
another, or secondary purpose, which may be improper.").
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writ of mandamus) if the corporation refuses to comply with a proper
14

demand for access.
A director's right to inspect the corporate books and records is more
extensive than that of a shareholder, because it is a corollary to the
director's fiduciary duties. 5 Without access to information, the director

cannot manage the company. 16 The scope of the director's information
right is all encompassing; every company record that is reasonably
related to the director's position is at the director's disposal. 7 Unlike
the shareholder's inspection right, which is qualified by the proper

purpose requirement, the director's right has been described as absolute,
unqualified,' 8 and (by a majority of the courts) without regard to
motive.1 9 Thus, even a hostile director is entitled to receive what the

other directors are given, because "[t]he duty to manage the corporation
rests alike upon each and every one of the directors. 'z Of course, the
shareholders may remove a director from the board. Until then,
however, courts have held that the company's remedies against misuse
of information are generally ex post

-

14. Carter v. Wilson Constr. Co., Inc., 348 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 1986); Cox, supra
note 8, at § 13.08.
15.
Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 128-29 (Del Ch. 1969); Moore
v. State Bank of Hallsville, 561 S.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Mo. App. 1978); Cox, supra note
8, at§ 13.11.
16. Machen v. Machen & Mayer Elec. Mfg. Co., 85 A. 100, 102 (Pa. 1912) ("It is
the duty of directors to manage the affairs of the corporation... and for that purpose
they should secure all information affecting the corporation from every available
source... [including] the books and documents of the corporation itself.").
17. Kortim, 769 A.2d at 118; Machen, 85 A. 100at 104.
18. Machen, 85 A. 100 at 104 ("The right of a director to inspect the books ... is
unqualified .... The protection of the interests of the company.., require that [a
director's] right to an inspection of the books be absolute."); See also Moore, 561
S.W.2d at 725; Lau v. DSI Enterprises, Inc., 477 N.Y.S.2d. 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
19.
Pilat v. Broach Sys., Inc., 260 A.2d 13, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) ("A
showing of hostile intent ...will not affect a director's right of inspection."); Dusel v.
Castellani, 350 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1973); Davis v. Keilson Offset Co. Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d
540, 542 (1948). For an inspection right qualified by the absence of a hostile purpose,
see Paschall v. Scott, 247 P.2d 543, 548-49 (1952); Hemingway v. Hemingway, 19 A.
766 (1890).
20. Machen, 237 Pa. at 218.
21.
Dusel, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 258; Moore, 561 S.W.2d. at 725. See also Kortiim, 769
A.2d at 124 (holding that the director's "inspection rights shall be unrestricted, except
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Consequently, with respect to corporate information, a director is an
insider

with

real-time

access

to

company

contracts,

customer

information, business plans, and records circulated among the board
members. A shareholder, in contrast, relies on company disclosures
made voluntarily or compelled through the courts.

Given that

competitively sensitive information tends to expire quickly, delay is
often as effective as denial.22 A minority equity stake that does not
entitle its holder to designate at least one director is therefore generally
not sufficient to provide an investor with a meaningful listening line into
the strategic decision making process of the target.

B. Effects on the Investor
Partial ownership, even if it is a purely passive minority interest, is
likely to adversely impact the competitive incentives of the investorcompetitor. 23 Those effects may be classified as either unilateral or
coordinated.
Unilateral theories of competitive harm assume that the investor (A)
and the target (B) are not attempting to collude and make their

competitive decisions independently of one another.24 Even if A's
investment in B does not confer any control or information rights, A will
take into account the effect of its decisions on B in order to maximize
the sum of its own profits plus the return on its investment in B.
Consider the following example:

for the... restriction that no information derived from the inspection will be shared
with" a competing subsidiary).
22. That is true for most price information and contract terms. However, trade
secrets, information about marginal cost, and long term contracts are examples of
competitively relevant information that is less time sensitive.
23. O'Brien & Salop, Competitive Effects, supra note 5, at 571-73, 575-76;
O'Brien & Salop, Competitive Effects: Reply, supra note 5, at 613; Gilo, supra note 5,

at 8-9. In this context, competitive effects "arise solely because [partial ownership]
arrangements link the fortunes of actual or potential competitors, producing a positive
correlation among their profits." HERBERT HOvENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 548 (2nd Ed. 1999); see also R.J.
Reynolds & B.R. Snapp, The Competitive Effects of PartialEquity Interests and Joint
Ventures, 4 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 141, 142 (1986); but see Dubrow, supra note 5, at

131-37 (being critical of the overly abstract nature of the underlying model).
24.

O'Brien & Salop, CompetitiveEffects, supra note 5, at 568-69.
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A makes red widgets and B, A 's closest competitor, makes blue
widgets at constant marginalcosts of $8/widget. At a price of $10, A
and B sell 10 widgets each. If A were to raise the price for red
widgets from $10 to $11, it would lose three customers to B and one
customer would stop buying widgets (of any color) altogether. A 's
total profits would drop from $20 (10*$2) to $18 (6*$3). Now
suppose that A first acquires 35% of B's stock and then increasesthe
pricefor red widgets from $10 to $11. B gains $6 (3*$2), $2.10 of
which belong to A ($6*0.35). A loses $2 from its own operations
and gains $2. 10from its investment in B. Thus, A's totalprofits have
increased from $20 to $20.10. The investment made the price
increase profitable, and thus diminished A's incentive to compete
with B at the margin.

While in a unilateral effects model, B does not react to A's price
increase, theories of coordinated effects take into account B's incentives
to adjust its own prices in reaction to A's price increase.
The
coordinated effects model presented below assumes a duopoly of A and
B in a differentiated product market and that A and B only have two
choices, to compete (c) or to hold back (h). The model further assumes
that there are two different types of firms, aggressive firms and
cooperative firms.
Suppose that an aggressive firm has the following
order of preferences: (c,h) > (h,h) > (c,c) > (h,c) and that a cooperative
firm's order of preferences is (h,h) > (c,h) > (c,c) > (h,c). 6 The
aggressive firm thus derives greater profits from competing against a
firm that is holding back than from mutual cooperation, i.e., (c,h) >
(h,h). By contrast, a cooperative firm derives greater profits from

25. Gilo, supranote 5, at 15-20.
26.
See MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 15, 17-21
(2004). Both orders of preferences have been suggested to model an arms race between
two countries. The "aggressive" country's favorite outcome is that it has bombs and the
other country doesn't (c,h); the second best outcome is that neither country has bombs
(h,h); the third best outcome is that both countries have bombs (c,c), and the least
favored outcome is that only the other country has bombs (h,c). A game between two
aggressive countries results in a prisoner's dilemma situation. An alternative model of
the arms race assumes "cooperative" preferences, i.e., both countries prefer a situation
in which neither has bombs (h,h) to a situation in which it has bombs and the other
country doesn't (c,h), because "the cost of arming outweighs the benefit if the other
country does not arm itself." Id. at 20-21. A game between two "cooperative" players
(a "stag hunt" game, in Osborne's terminology), results in two Nash equilibria.
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mutual cooperation than from competing with a firm that is holding
back, i.e., (h,h) > (c,h). 7
Consider four initial games (Tables 1.1-1.4), where A and B have
no financial interests in each other, with the following payoffs (in $)

assigned to the firms' preferences: (c,h)=3 > (h,h)=2 > (c,c)=l > (h,c)=
-1 for the aggressive firm and (h,h)=3 > (c,h)=2 > (c,c)=1 > (h,c)=- I for
the cooperative firm.28

27. Aggressive firms tend to have lower marginal costs and/or smaller market
shares. A typical aggressive firm would be a new entrant with superior technology in a
market dominated by a higher cost incumbent with a large market share. Lower
marginal costs lead to higher profits in a price war. Likewise, smaller firms gain market
share more quickly (which offsets the lost profits from a lower unit price), while the
market share leader incurs relatively greater margin losses from matching a lower price.
For the same reasons, the firm with the larger market share has more to gain from
collusion than the smaller firm. Note that both effects tend to counteract each other
over time, as low cost firms tend to expand their market shares at the expense of highcost firms. Thus, a high-cost firm with a small share can be (or can become) more
aggressive than a low cost firm with a large market share; it depends on which effect
dominates. See Gilo, supra note 5, at 16-20 & n.39. Likewise, high levels of debt may
increase a firm's aggressiveness.
28.
While these payoffs (and the assumptions regarding investment levels and
penalties discussed below) are illustrative for a certain range of situations, they are by
no means exhaustive. For example, increasing the aggressive firm's payoff for (c,h)
from $3 to $4 changes the order of preferences and eliminates the (h,h) equilibria from
(unilateral or cross) equity investments in Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.2; the debt analysis
remains unaffected as long as the payoff from (h,h) exceeds the payoff from (c,h) minus
the debt penalty. With a $3 payoff, the order of preferences for A in, say, Table 3.2 is
(h,h) > (c,h) > (c,c) > (h,c), resulting in two Nash equilibria at (c,c) and (h,h). With a
$4 payoff, however, the order of preferences remains identical to that in Table 1.2; i.e.,
(c,h) > (h,h) >(c,c) > (h,c), resulting in only one equilibrium at (c,c). Thus, the greater
the payoff from (c,h) relative to (hh), the lower the likelihood that a minority
shareholding generates anticompetitive effects by changing the aggressive firm's order
of preferences from (c,h) > (hh) to (hh) > (c,h). Given the influence of the payoffs
(and/or investment levels, debt penalties) on the order of preferences in Tables 2-5,
applying the results of the analysis to a particular case requires that the order of
preferences in that case correspond to the preferences expressed in the respective tables.
However, even if there is no direct match for every permutation, the methodology
remains valid and the results below may still serve as a benchmark.
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Table 1.1 pictures a game between two aggressive firms. 29 Tables

1.2 and 1.3 describe games between an aggressive and a cooperative
firm, and Table 1.4 describes a game between two cooperative firms. In

Table 1.1, (c) is the dominant strategy for both A and B, resulting in a
(c,c) equilibrium. This outcome is referred to as a prisoner's dilemma,
because even though (h,h) would yield greater benefits for both players,

coordination would break down as A and B each have an incentive to
cheat.30 In Table 1.2, A's dominant strategy is (c), whereas B does not
have a dominant strategy. However, as A's choice to compete is clear,
B will choose likewise and the resulting equilibrium is (c,c). The

outcome for Table 1.3 is identical to that of Table 1.2, with the positions
of A and B reversed. In Table 1.4, both firms value mutual cooperation

(h,h) more highly than competing against a finn that is holding back
(c,h). As a result, there are two Nash equilibria (c,c) and (h,h). Thus, in
the games described in Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, both firms choose to
compete, whereas in Table 1.4 they (may) choose to cooperate.31
Now suppose that A and B both purchase 30% of each other's

stock. Following the acquisition, A participates in 30% of B's profits
and losses and vice versa.32 The effect of that cross-investment on the

firms' incentives is shown in Tables 2.1-2.4.
29. In the tables, A+(B+) indicates that A(B) is an aggressive firm and A-(B-) that
A(B) is a cooperative firm. Each player's best response functions are indicated in bold.
30. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 38-42 (4th ed.
2003) (discussing game theory and the prisoner's dilemma).
31.
Both Nash equilibria in Table 1.4 are equally stable in a strategic game with no
temporal component. However, if the game is played sequentially (e.g., as an extensive
form game with perfect information), backwards induction produces a unique result at
(h,h). Sequential moves are particularly plausible in the games described below, where
one player invests in the other.
32.
After the investment, the preferences of the investor are no longer strictly
"selfish." For example, the payoff function p for A after a unilateral 30% equity
investment in B is p(A)+p(B)*0.3. A's payoff function after a 30% cross-investment in
and by B is p(A)*0.7+p(B)*0.3, i.e., A captures 30% of B's profits (leaving 70% to B)
and B diverts 30% of A's profits (leaving 70% to A). Thus, if the payoff for (c,c) in
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In each of the Tables 2.1-2.4 two equilibria exist at (c,c) and (h,h).
Compared to the pre-investment situation (Tables 1.1-1.3), where (c)
was the dominant strategy for the aggressive firm, the cross-investment
has enabled stable coordination by decreasing the payoffs for competing
against a firm that is holding back (c,h) across the board3 3 and, in Tables
2.2 and 2.3, by increasing the aggressive firm's payoff from mutual
cooperation (h,h).34 The cross-investment, by modifying the respective
payoffs, has changed the order of preferences for the aggressive firm
from (c,h) > (h,h) to (h,h) > (c,h). That change constitutes a
characteristic anticompetitive effect of a financial interest in a
competitor within the coordinated effects model. Consequently, equity
cross-investments of sufficient size have a distinct anti-competitive
potential.
The effect of unilateral equity investments is shown below. A
purchases 30% of B's stock. B has no equity interest in A.
B-

B+

A+

c
0.7

h
-0.7

c 1.3 2.7
2.1 1.4
h -0. 12.6
Table 3.1

A+

c
h
0..7-0.7
C1.3
2.7
1.4
2.11
h-0.4 2.9
Table 3.2

B-

A-

c
h
I0.7 -0.7
c 1.3
1.7
I 2.1
1.4
h -0.1
3.6
Table 3.3

h
C
0.7 -0.7
1.3
1.7
h
1.41 2.11
0.4 13.9
c

A-

Table 3.4

Only in Table 3.2, where investor A is an aggressive firm and target
B is a cooperative firm, does the investment lead to a new equilibrium at

Table 1.1 is (1,1), the payoff after a 30% unilateral investment of A in B as expressed in
Table 3.1 is (1.3,0.7) and after a 30% cross-investment as expressed in Table 2.1 is
(1,1), i.e., A keeps 70% of its own and gets 30% of B's profits and vice versa.
33. Compare, for example, A's payoff for (c,h)=3 in Table 1.1 to (c,h)= 1.8 in Table
2.1.
34. Compare, for example, A's payoff for (h,h)=2 in Table 1.2 to (h,h)=2.3 in
Table 2.2.
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(h,h).35 An investment by a cooperative firm (A) in an aggressive firm

(B) as in Table 3.3 does not change the equilibrium results. In Table
3.1, (c) remains the dominant strategy for both players and in Table 3.4
(h,h) remains the likely outcome. Interestingly, where A and B are both
aggressive firms as shown in Table 3.1, the investment increases the

investor's (A's) gains from (c,c) by 30% compared to the pre-investment
situation in Table 1.1.36 Thus, only where (i) the incentives of A and B

are not symmetrical and (ii) the aggressive firm invests in the
cooperative firm (but not vice versa) does a sufficient unilateral equity
investment change the incentives of the investor.3 7
II. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF DEBT INVESTMENTS

Debt investments, such as loans or bonds, differ significantly from
equity investments in terms of corporate control (over the debtor) and
financial interest (of the creditor). Courts and agencies have been
chiefly concerned with equity investments. There has only been a small
number of cases where anticompetitive effects of debt investments have
been central to the courts' or the agencies' analysis.

3

As with partial

ownership, the courts' main concerns have been corporate control and
access to information, not the incentives of the creditor from the
financial investment. 39 The following analysis explains why, as a rule,
lenient treatment of debt investments under the antitrust laws is well
justified.

35. In Table 1.2, before the investment, A's order of preference was (c,h) > (hh).
In Table 3.2, after the unilateral investment in B, it is (h,h) > (c,h).
36. Consequently, an aggressive firm may choose to invest in another aggressive
firm and still compete vigorously, e.g., where in a growing market, A predicts that it
will not be able to expand capacity proportionally to the increase in demand so that A
and B will both earn economic profits.
37. See Gilo, supra note 5, at 16 ("[I1f all firms in the industry are equally triggerhappy, the only way passive investment can facilitate collusion is if each firm in the
industry passively invests in a competitor."). In contrast, "[i]n markets in which some
firms are more trigger-happy than others, it is enough if the more trigger-happy firms
invest in a competitor for collusion to be facilitated." Id. at 17.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See Gilo, supra note 5, at 33 ("In debt cases the courts have focused only on
whether the creditor would attempt to exert its influence over the debtor through its
position as creditor.").
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A. Debt and Equity
A firm generates cash flow from its capital, which is the property
and the money that the firm requires to do business. 40 There are two
main sources of capital, equity and debt, and two constituencies
representing these sources, shareholders and creditors. In economic
terms, shareholders and creditors are both security holders in the firm
with different claims to the firm's cash flows from operations and, in the
event of liquidation, from the sale of assets.4' Shareholders have a claim
to the residual cash flows, left over after meeting all other promised
payments. Creditors have a prior claim to interest and principal
payments on a periodic basis and a prior claim to the firm's assets in the
event of liquidation.42 The creditors' claims are contractual in nature,
fixed in time and capped in value.43 In contrast the shareholders' claims
are based on a property right and are indefinite in both time and value.
Among the most significant differences between equity and debt are
the consequences of the different attitudes of shareholders and creditors
towards risk."4 Both creditors and shareholders are in control of their
downside risk: the shareholders because their liability is limited to the
investment and the creditors because they cannot lose more than the
principal of the loan. However, the upside potential of the shareholder is
unlimited while the creditor has a fixed rate of return no matter how
large a part of the firm's profits are generated as a result of its capital
contribution. Shareholders make (and lose) money at the margin,
creditors do not. Consequently, shareholders are willing to pay for
potential upsides with an increased risk of default, while creditors, who
are compensated ex ante for the expected default risk, are opposed to

40. See RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE CORPORATION § 1:04 (2002).
41.
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW
413,416 (1986).
42. ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE: A USER'S MANUAL 214
(John Wiley & Sons 1999).
In practice, debt is generally rolled over so that its fixed maturity is more of a
43.
legal distinction than an economic reality, which is nevertheless important for
classification purposes. See generally id. at 214-24 (discussing the many varieties of
debt including secured, unsecured and hybrid debt instruments).
44.
There are, of course, other significant differences, for example, that under the
U.S. tax laws dividend payments are made from after-tax cash flows while interest
payments are deductible as expenses. See BOOTH, supranote 40, at § 3:14.
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any alteration of that risk. 45 The conflict between shareholders and
creditors becomes more and more pronounced the more highly
leveraged the firm is, i.e., the higher the ratio of debt to equity. That is
because the shareholders as a group have less to lose (in absolute terms)
and more to gain (in relative terms), while46the creditors only stand to
lose as illustrated by the following example:
Consider a company with $100 in cash as its only asset. The
company's debt is $80 (a loan from B) and its stock, owned by A, is
worth $20. An investment opportunity arises that has a 50% chance
ofyielding $150 and a 50% chance ofyielding $10. From A 's point
of view, this is an investment risk worth taking. If the project yields
$10, A receives $0. If the projectyields $150, A receives $70. Given
that the chances for either outcome are 50%, the expected stock
value is ($70+$0)/2=$35,compared to a present equity value of $20.
B, as a creditor, would be adamantly opposed to the investment. If
the projectyields $150, B receives $80. If the project yields $10, B
receives $10.
Thus, the expected value of the debt is
($80+$10)/2=$45. Note that the expected value of the company
would decline from $100 to $80 ($45+$35), which confirms that
increasing shareholder value does not necessarily coincide with
increasingfirm value.

The risk of creditor expropriation by the company's management, 7
as described in the example above, is the primary reason for including
48
protective covenants in credit agreements and bond indentures.
Typical covenants restrict dividends, additional debt, risk altering
investments such as major acquisitions, and the disposition of significant

45.
McDaniel, supra note 41, at 418.
46.
The example is based on Yakok Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure
for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. REV. 447, 454 (1999); RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 517-18 (Irwin/McGraw Hill
6th ed. 2000).
47. BOOTH, supra note 40, at § 3:12 (explaining that management is the
shareholders' agent to whom it owes fiduciary duties. Management generally owes no
fiduciary duties to the firm's creditors.) See BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 46, at
721-22; McDaniel, supra note 41, at 419-21 (illustrating that the conflict between
shareholders and creditors and the resulting management agency problem is not limited
to ex post alteration of risk through investment decisions. Other ways of benefiting
shareholders at the expense of creditors are dividend distributions, spin-offs, and
increasing the debt/equity ratio through taking on additional debt or stock repurchases.)
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 720; McDaniel, supra note 41, at 424.
48.
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assets. 49 In addition, credit agreements may contain "state-of-the-firm"

covenants, requiring, e.g., minimum financial ratios, and net worth or
equity cushions.50 Virtually every credit agreement provides for creditor
information rights, generally in the form of an affirmative duty of the
debtor to supply the creditor with relevant information.5 These veto and
information rights are significant from an antitrust point of view, as they
exchange
have given rise to claims of corporate control and information
52
debt.
of
acquisition
the
on
based
1
§
and
§7
of
in violation
B. CorporateControl and Information Exchange
Even though credit agreements generally require the borrower to

provide the lender with regularly updated financial information (audit
reports, financial statements, notice of reportable events) and give the
lender a right to request additional financial and other information,53
these provisions should not require the borrower to make accessible
competitively sensitive information and records, such as detailed
strategic plans, marketing plans, and customer specific pricing
The lender has a legitimate interest in receiving
information.
information only to the extent necessary for assessing changes in the
credit risk. Where the creditor's request goes beyond what is required to
assess the risk of default, the debtor is under no obligation to provide
that information.54 And even where the creditor rightfully demanded the

49.
Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants in Commercial Loan Documentation:
Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335, 340-43 (1991); see also BOOTH, supra
note 40, at § 3:06; Amihud et al., supranote 46, at 454-55.
50. Lloyd, supra note 49, at 340-43.
51.
Amihud et al., supra note 46, at 463-65.
52. See infra Part III.
53. Financial statements are the lender's primary source of information about a
borrower. The frequency with which financial statements are required depends on the
borrower's creditworthiness. Public company borrowers are usually required to make
available SEC filings. In addition, creditors require notices of litigation, regulatory
action, ERISA compliance and-depending on the borrower's business--other
information, such as age of receivables or inventory turnover from a retailer borrower.
See SANDRA STERN, STRUCTURING AND DRAFrING COMMERCIAL LOAN AGREEMENTS

5.01 [4]-[5] (A. S. Pratt & Sons rev. ed. 2001).
54. Consequently, where the debtor voluntarily provides detailed information to a
competing creditor, inferences of collusion may be warranted; the loan could be a
facilitating device. However, where there is no evidence of collusion and a debtor first

620

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &

[Vol. IX

FINANCIAL LA W
information, so that the debtor's refusal results in a breach of an

affirmative covenant, the only remedy generally available to the creditor
is acceleration of the loan.55
Consider a situation in which A and B are competitors andA is also
B's creditor. B intends to acquire C, which would significantly
strengthen its competitive position vis-6-vis A. B informs its creditors
(banks, bondholders, corporate lenders) of the planned acquisition.
The creditors conclude that the acquisition would not increase B's
default risk and all give their consent with the exception of A.
Having received advance warning of B's competitive move, A now
wants to block B's acquisition of C. Since there is no alteration of
risk, A's actions are motivated solely by its competitive relationship
with B.

As an attempt to exercise corporate control, A's obstruction is
unlikely to succeed, because B may simply choose to ignore A's
opposition and consummate the transaction. Even if B was in breach of
a negative covenant, thereby giving A the right to accelerate the loan
(which is unlikely, given that the acquisition does not alter the risk of

default), A has no incentive to in fact demand immediate repayment
(other than maybe protecting its reputation), because the quality of A's
investment in B has not declined.56 Another option for B is to refinance
the loan and remove A as a creditor.17 Unlike a shareholder who is a
provides large amounts of data to a competing creditor that go beyond its obligation
under the credit agreement and subsequently claims to have been injured by its
competitor's information access, one may reasonably infer that the information was not
in fact competitively sensitive. Cf.STERN, supra note 53, at
5.01 [4]-[5] (listing the
kind of information which may be requested by a creditor for purposes of assessing a
(potential) debtor's creditworthiness).
55. While breach of a negative covenant gives the creditor the right to immediate
acceleration, the debtor in breach of an affirmative covenant generally has a grace
period to cure the defect, e.g., provide the competing creditor with some, but not all,
information regarding a potential acquisition. See STERN, supra note 53, at 5.01 [2][d].
56. As indicated, the principal legal remedy for breach of a covenant by the
borrower is acceleration of the loan. Amihud et al., supra note 46, at 467; BOOTH,supra
note 40, at § 3:06. That puts the borrower in a relatively strong position where (i) the
creditor provokes the breach (e.g., by unreasonably withholding consent) and (ii) there
are refinancing options available.
57. Early repayment is generally permitted, even though some loan agreements
provide for penalties. In any event, refinancing is not without cost for B, which may
make a "debt greenmail" strategy attractive to competing creditors. However, debt
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partial owner of the company, A can be removed against his will."
Lastly, B may seek to compel A's consent by enforcing the covenant of
good faith implicit in every loan agreement (e.g., by threatening
litigation for bad faith acceleration)i 9
The creditor's influence over the debtor increases significantly
where the debtor is in financial distress, because the distressed debtor
has fewer (and therefore more expensive) refinancing alternatives. If the
debtor is in a financially hopeless situation, refinancing options may no
longer be available at all. Once accelerating, the loan would result in the
debtor's insolvency, the creditor has gained significant de facto
influence over the debtor's management. A nearly insolvent borrower
will most likely be in breach of a number of state-of-the-firm covenants,
giving its creditors the right to accelerate the loan. The debtor thus
relies on its creditors to grant periodic waivers of covenants for its
survival. Under these circumstances a creditor-competitor might be able
to justify a refusal to grant a waiver solely on the basis of its creditor
interests, regardless of its (further) motivations as a competitor.'
Therefore, as long as the debtor remains solvent and has viable
refinancing options, debt investments do not provide the creditor with
meaningful corporate control or information access rights. Where such
rights exist under a credit agreement, their enforceability by a competing
creditor is likely to be severely limited. However, once the debtor is in
financial distress and consequently has run out of viable refinancing
alternatives, the creditor's influence increases significantly to a point
where it may well exceed the influence conferred by a comparable

greenmail could expose A to contractual liability under the loan agreement and may in
addition be actionable as a business tort, and, if A has sufficient market power, as
(attempted) monopolization. For purposes of this Article, debt is assumed to be
repayable at any time without penalties.
58. In the case of a syndicated loan, B may require consent of (some of) the other
lenders in order to remove A.
59.

EDWARD

F.

MANNINO,

LENDER

LIABILITY

AND

BANKING

LITIGATION

§§ 5.03[3][a], [b][ii] (Law Journals Seminars Press rev. ed. 2004) (1989) (discussing
the scope of the good faith performance obligation implicit in every contract).
60. However, accelerating the loan, even under these circumstances, is not without
risk, as courts have found creditors liable "for breaching the implied duty of good faith
in accelerating a loan even where the borrower was in default and such action was
permitted under the lender's security agreement." Id. at § 5.03 [3][b][ii].
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equity investment, provided that the creditor has a legal basis for
unilaterally accelerating the loan.61
C. FinancialInterest
Does extending a loan to competitor B change the competitive
incentives of creditor A? Unlike a shareholder that participates in the
residual cash flows of the target, the loan agreement does not allow A to
share in an increase of B's value. Thus, as a creditor, A would not
recapture any portion of the profits from sales diverted to B as a result of
a unilateral price increase. Debt, unlike equity, does not automatically
link the economic fortunes of the parties.
One exception to the rule that creditor A does not profit from debtor
B's operational gains might be a situation where B is a company in
distress. Suppose that A purchases B's distressed debt at a discount.
Subsequently, A raises its own prices to supra-competitive levels, which
causes operational losses of $2 for A and operational gains of $6 for B.
B's gain lowers its risk of default, as a result of which the value of B's
debt increases. If the gains from A's debt investment in B exceed $2,
the price increase would be profitable. However, unlike equity, which
provides A with a continuous income stream from its investment in B,
the debt appreciation is a one shot deal with a ceiling. If A loses $2
from the price increase in the first period and gains $3 from bond
appreciation to par, the price increase is profitable. In the second period,
however, A continues losing $2, while the bonds no longer appreciate.
B's operational gains now increase the value of B's residual cash flow,

61.
Where a syndicate of lenders has provided a loan, a single creditor may not have
the right to unilaterallyaccelerate the loan. Usually, acceleration requires the consent of a
majority (or a super-majority) of the lenders in the syndicate. Where the debtor is already
in default and relies on the continued grant of waivers by the syndicate, a member of the
syndicate may be able to veto the extension of the waiver. Many syndicated loan
documents require a threshold investment for exercising a veto, e.g., one-third of the
syndicated loan. In that instance, a debt holding below the threshold level does not confer
any meaningful power of the nature discussed above to the creditor even if the debtor has
no other refinancing options. See Vantico Holdings S.A. v. Apollo Mgmt., LP, 247 F.
Supp. 2d. 437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing a case where lender's debt ownership
requirement for vetoing borrower's decisions was 34%).
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in which A has no stake. 62 As a consequence, the unilateral effects of
(passive) debt investments are generally much less significant than those
63
of partial ownership.
D. CoordinatedEffects
In order for a debt investment to enable collusion, it must serve as a
credible commitment of the creditor not to compete with the debtor. No
commitment is credible as long as competing (c) remains the creditor's
dominant strategy. Consequently, the creditor must change its incentive
structure, so that the payoff for (h,h) exceeds that of (c,h) and it must
make sure that the debtor is aware of that change. Tipping the scale in
favor of cooperation can be achieved through increasing the payoff for
cooperation or through decreasing the payoff for competition. Equity
does both, but debt only does the latter. As a commitment device, debt
functions as a self-imposed conditional penalty, not unlike a
performance bond. If A fails to cooperate, it forfeits the bond, which
must be sufficiently large to offset any gains from competition. 64 Under
these circumstances, it is rational for A to cooperate, which enables
collusion (h,h) between A and B.
Suppose that the creditor loses the entire loan with certainty if it
decides to compete with the debtor. The tables below describe situations
where A and B have granted loans to each other (cross debt investment).
If either of them chooses to compete, it incurs a penalty of -$3.
c

h

-2

A+

-2

B+

B-

B+

c

-0

Table 4.1

h

2

A+

C

-1
0

Table 4.2

A-

-2

Bc

h

C

-2

-1

-21

-1

Table 4.3

h
-11

A-

Table 4.4

62. Theoretically, A could sell the bonds after the first period and then drop prices
back to pre-investment levels. In this scenario, there would be a competitive effect;
however, it would probably be rather limited.
63. Gilo, supra note 5, at 21.
64. A calculates the amount of the penalty as a function of the size of the bond and
the probability of forfeiture in the event of non-compliance. If the bond's size is $10
and the probability of forfeiture is 100% (i.e., every breach of the promise not to
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Compared to the initial games (Tables 1.1-1.4), new (h,h) equilibria
appear in Tables 4.1-4.3. The debt penalty renders (c,h) and (c,c)
unprofitable. Holding back (h) becomes the new dominant strategy for A
and B across the board. Thus, in a situation where the party deciding to
compete triggers a penalty sufficient to wipe out any gains from such
competition, cross debt investments may have distinct anticompetitive
effects.65
The effects of unilateral debt investments are shown in the tables
below. In these examples, A extends credit to B. If A competes, it
incurs a penalty of-$3.
B-

1+
e
1
A+

C-2
h-1

0
3 2

Table 5.1

B+
c
1

h
-1
A+

c-2
h -1
Table 5.2

h
-1

Bc

A-

-1
Table 5.3

h
-1c

c
1

h
-

Ah 1
Table 5.4

Following the debt commitment, holding back (h) has become
investor A's dominant strategy. However, because the debt investment
is unilateral, B's competitive incentives remain unaffected. Thus,
whether B chooses to compete or to hold back depends entirely on
whether B is an aggressive firm (in which case B will compete) or a
cooperative firm (in which case B will hold back). Only in Table 5.2
does A's investment create an equilibrium at (h,h). However, and more
importantly, in Tables 5.1 and 5.3, the debt investment creates a (h,c)
equilibrium, which effectively precludes A from fighting back if B
decides to compete. Thus, the unilateral debt investor faces a significant
risk of error. If B is an aggressive firm or if B turns into an aggressive
firm subsequent to A's investment, A may set a trap for itself The latter
is an important difference to the equity investments discussed above,
where partial ownership in an aggressive firm was merely ineffectual as
a commitment device; see Tables 3.1 and 3.3. In contrast, debt

compete will lead to complete forfeiture), the expected value of the penalty is $10. If
the probability of forfeiture drops to 50%, the expected value of the penalty is $5.
65. The qualifier ("may") is warranted because triggering the debt penalty by
competitive actions (and competitive actions only) with a sufficient degree of reliability
is highly unlikely.

2004] DEBT INVESTMENTS & FEDERAL ANTITR USTLA W

625

investments in an aggressive competitor leave the investor worse off
compared to the initial games in Tables 1.1 and 1.3.
The model above rests on the assumption that the creditor's choice
to compete does, in fact, trigger the penalty. However, creating and/or
maintaining that condition in the real world would be a daunting task,
because explicit non-compete and penalty provisions are unlawful under
§ 1 and thus unenforceable in court. Commentators and litigants have
therefore focused on the debtor's bankruptcy as the de facto link
between competitive action on the part of the creditor and the incurring
of the penalty, i.e., the loss of the loan.66 Bankruptcy, however, is a poor
device for connecting the market behavior of a creditor to the inability of
a competing debtor to repay a loan with any degree of reliability. As a
threshold matter, the debtor must remain at the brink of bankruptcy for
the duration of the arrangement. As soon as the debtor returns to a
minimal state of financial health, the creditor's commitment is no longer
credible and competitive behavior might ensue. Moreover, as a
consequence of the debtor's required state of continued financial
weakness, the debtor will not only be vulnerable to the creditor's
competitive actions but also to unrelated events in the marketplace (e.g.,
changes in input costs, interest rates, shifts in demand, etc.). The
creditor therefore faces a significant risk of incurring the penalty by
accident. Even if the triggering condition could be calibrated to the
creditor's actions with sufficient accuracy, there would still be no
predictable connection between the debtor's insolvency and the loss of
the loan. What happens to a significant loan in bankruptcy is highly
uncertain. It may be repaid in full, in part, not at all, deferred, or
converted into equity, to name just a few possibilities in reorganization.
Only if the debtor's assets are, in fact, entirely non-competitive and
worthless (in which case coordination would probably not significantly
lessen competition to begin with) would the creditor lose its loan with
sufficient certainty.67
66. Gilo, supra note 5, at 21. For case discussions, see infra Part III.
67. Creating a stable cartel equilibrium with a weak competitor is less troublesome
from an antitrust perspective than collusion among strong competitors. However, in
settings with more than two firms involved, A could be the only aggressive firm that
makes a broader cartel equilibrium among, say, A, B, C, and D impossible. If A

commits itself through a loan to the weakest competitor B, it may not gain much from
B's cooperation in a (h,h,h,h) state; however, A may gain substantially from not having

to compete with C and D.
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Another problem with debt as a commitment device is that the
debtor's required state of financial weakness might change its
competitive incentives so that coordination ultimately breaks down.
Suppose that A invests in B in order to change its (A's) dominant
strategy from (c) to (h). As a consequence of its financial weakness, B's
market share deteriorates to the point that B has more to gain from
starting a price war with A (c,h) than from continued cooperation (h,h).
As long as B remains susceptible to A's attack, A is caught in its own
trap, as (h,c) remains a better choice than (c,c), see Tables 5.1 and 5.3
above. B can use the threat of bankruptcy to compete against A with
impunity. Once B returns to financial health (e.g., after having gained
sufficient market share at A's expense), A's strategic commitment is no
longer effective.
While cross debt investments have a tendency to increase the
probability of a collusive equilibrium, the same cannot be said for
unilateral debt investments without further qualifications. Unless certain
threshold conditions are met, unilateral debt as a commitment device is
by and large ineffectual, because there is no predictable link between the
creditor's actions and the triggering of the penalty. Thus, from a
financial interest point of view, debt investments have no significant
anticompetitive potential unless (i) the debtor is in poor financial health;
(ii) the creditor (and only the creditor), through specific competitive
actions, can significantly increase the probability of the debtor's
insolvency; (iii) once the debtor has become insolvent, its assets would
exit the market; 68 and (iv) liquidation of the assets is insufficient to
68. The assets exit the market when the insolvent company ceases to exist as a
going concern with the consequence that its production capacity will no longer be
available to serve market demand. The assets do not exit the market if they are bought
by a financial investor or a strategic buyer with the intent to continue operations and to
reintroduce capacity into the market. Thus, implicit in the "exiting the market"
assumption is that B has a non-competitive asset base. If B's assets were competitive,
the firm would be a takeover target and its assets would likely remain in the market
under different management. The "exiting the market" condition also relates to a
broader issue. If B's assets are non-competitive, then A could drive B from the
marketplace by competitive means and subsequently enjoy monopoly profits. Thus, for
A, the desirability of (c,h) relative to (h,h) increases with B's weakness. Conversely, a
strong rival makes (h,h) more desirable (yet less obtainable) relative to (c,h). That
relationship further underscores the partially self-refuting character of a debtcommitment strategy. A more complete model would have to take the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the rivals into account.
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guarantee repayment of the creditor's loan.69 Moreover, (v) taking into
account the overall probability of the creditor's competitive action

resulting in the ultimate loss of the loan, the debt penalty must be of
sufficient size to offset any gains from competition. As a result, the
anticompetitive potential of debt investments from the financial interest
in a competitor is much more limited than that of a (passive) minority
equity stake. 70
III. DEBT INVESTMENTS IN THE COURTS
Courts have addressed the competitive effects of debt investments
in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., Mr. Frank, Inc.
v. Waste Management,Inc., and, most recently, Vantico Holdings S.A. v.

Apollo Management LP.7

The consent order in United States v. The

Gillette Co. also touches upon competitive effects of debt holdings, even
though the primary focus is on the partial ownership aspects of the
transaction.72 Thus, there is little guidance as to how courts and

69. As a consequence, the ideal debt commitment device would be a substantial
unsecured loan. In contrast, fully secured senior debt would be a poor choice for a
competitor, as chances of (at least partial) repayment are higher even in the event of a
bankruptcy with minimal assets. Here, the inherent tensions between the roles of the
investor as a competitor and as a creditor come to a head. As a practical matter,
obtaining board approval for a significant unsecured loan to a competitor in distress is a
tall task for any firm's management, in particular as there is a significant risk of
shareholder lawsuits should the debtor default on the loan.
70. Gilo, supra note 5, at 21.
71.
MGM, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Mr. Frank, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 859, 867 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Vantico
Holdings, S.A. v. Apollo Mgmt. Ltd. P'ship, 247 F. Supp. 2d 437,456 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
The author represented Apollo Management LP in the Vantico litigation.
72. Gillette 11, supra note 4; Gillette I, supra note 4. In 1989, Gillette had agreed
to purchase (i) Wilkinson's world-wide wet shaving business and (ii) a 23% non-voting
equity stake and 50% of the subordinated debt (valued at $69 million) in Eemland,
Wilkinson's corporate parent. Gillette I, supra note 4, at 28,314. Following the DOJ's
challenge, Gillette abandoned the acquisition of Wilkinson's U.S. business. Gillette II,
supra note 4, at *1. The consent decree allowed Gillette to keep its 23% equity stake
and its debt holdings in Eemland, provided that Gillette refrained from, inter alia,
acquiring additional equity and debt, from seeking board representation, and from
influencing Eemland's business. Specifically with respect to debt, the consent decree
stipulated that:
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agencies would analyze competitor debt investments, which forces
corporate lenders to operate under significant uncertainty.73
A. MGM v. Transamerica (1969)74
The seminal case concerning debt investments under the antitrust
laws is MGM v. Transamerica, decided by the district court for the
Southern District of New York in 1969. 75 Tracy Investment Company
("Tracy") made a cash tender offer for 17% of MGM's shares, which, if
successful, would have given Tracy "working control" of and board
representation at MGM.76 The tender offer was valued at $36.5 million,
$30 million of which was to be financed through a loan from
Transamerica Financial Corp ("Financial").77 The loan was fully
secured, inter alia, by the MGM shares. 7' The crux of the case was that
Financial's parent, Transamerica Corp., happened to be the controlling
shareholder of United Artists, a direct competitor of MGM. 79 The court
considered two issues: (i) did the share pledge (i.e., using MGM's shares
as collateral for the loan) violate §7; and (ii) assuming that the parties

Gillette shall not.., use or attempt to use its creditor position in Eemland: (a) to
prevent or restrict Eemland's ability to refinance or obtain additional credit or capital;
(b) to initiate any action the effect of which reasonably could be expected to cause
Eemland to become insolvent or bankrupt; or (c) in the event of a proposed
reorganization of Eemland because of insolvency or bankruptcy concerns, to vote
against any reorganization plan proposed or supported by Eemland.
Gillette II, supra note 4, at *5.
73. The legal classification of debt investments under the antitrust laws is not just a
domestic problem; it also raises questions under the merger control regimes of other
jurisdictions. In Vantico, the German Federal Cartel Office investigated whether a 35%
debt investment constituted a concentration under §37(I)(4) of the Act against
Restraints of Competition ("GWB"). Ultimately, the agency did not take any action
after the debt was repaid. However, Cartel Office staff acknowledged that there was
disagreement within the Cartel Office as to whether debt investments would be
prosecuted under §37(I)(4) GWB on a going forward basis.
74. 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
75. Id. at 1344.
76. Id. at 1346-49.
77. Id. at 1346.
78. Id. at 1347.
79. Id. at 1346 ("The root of the controversy lies in the fact that the cash tender
offer is being financed by Financial, whose parent, Transamerica, owns 99.6% of
United Artists Corporation, a major competitor of MGM.").

2004] DEBTINVESTMENTS & FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

629

removed the pledge, would the loan by itself violate §7?8o With respect
to (i), the court decided that the share pledge constituted a violation of
§7, because Financial could have chosen to acquire the MGM shares in
the event of Tracy's bankruptcy.8 ' With respect to (ii) the court merely
enjoined Tracy and Financial from exchanging MGM-related
information.12
The court explicitly held that the debtor-creditor
relationship by itself posed no threat to competition.
The MGM court was concerned with threats to competition from
corporate control and information exchange. The creditor's financial
interest did not factor into the analysis. 84
A bare debtor-creditor relationship, standing by itself, gives the

creditor no control over the debtor's right to vote its stock. In this
respect the relationship differs sharply from those which have been

condemned because a company, either by contract, stock ownership,
market position or similar factors, possesses
the power to control or
85

influence its competitor's decisions.

Even though the bare debtor-creditor relationship lacks
anticompetitive potential, there may be "surrounding circumstances"
that could conceivably lead to a substantial lessening of competition,
"including the expressed purpose of the relationship, the debtor's
solvency or insolvency, the terms and size of the loan, the percentage
which it bears to the debtor's entire debt and capital structure, the
existence of other contracts or relationships between the parties, etc. 86
Consistent with the analysis above, most of the circumstances identified
by the MGM court are in fact necessary (albeit not sufficient) conditions
for control through debt investment, in particular insolvency and the
resulting lack of refinancing options combined with a significant loan.

80. Id. at 1350 ("Reduced to its simplest terms the essential question before us is:
Does the status of a major MGM competitor (Transamerica-United Artists-Financial) as

a substantial creditor of the prospective controlling shareholder (Tracy) pose a sufficient
threat to competition to run afoul of §7?").
81. Id. at 1349.
82. Id. at 1352, 1354.
83. Id. at 1350 ("In the case before us... it is difficult to foresee the probability of
anti-competitive effects flowing from the debtor-creditor relationship alone.")

84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
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However, the threat of insolvency must at least be probable. The mere
fact that "Tracy has not advanced any present plans for refinancing,
absent which Financial might have considerable power over it"88 was not
sufficient to establish a §7 violation.8 9 Thus, under MGM, absent special
circumstances, debt investments in competitors are lawful under §7.90
B. Mr. Frank v. Waste Management, Inc. (1984)91
In 1984, the district court for the Northern District of Illinois
decided Mr. Frank v. Waste Management, Inc. 92 Waste Management
Inc. ("WMI") provided waste disposal services. 93 Chem-Clear, a
competitor in the same geographic market, was one of WMI's potential
acquisition targets. 94 Chem-Clear was in financial distress; nevertheless,
it received a $140,000 loan from WMI. 9' Mr. Frank, Inc. ("Mr. Frank"),
a customer of WMI and Chem-Clear, brought suit against WMI's
"pattern of acquisitions" in violation of, inter alia, §7.96 The court
denied WMI's motion for summary judgment and found that there were

87.

See id. at 1350 ("[T]he mere possibility of anti-competitive effects is

insufficient .... In the absence of circumstances indicating a probability that the

creditor would use its position to influence MGM..., we do not believe that such a
debtor-creditor relationship should be categorically outlawed as a matter of law.")
(emphasis added).
88. Id. at 1351.
89. Id. at 1351-52 ("[Tlhe question of whether a debtor-creditor relationship must
be enjoined as threatening competition in violation of [§]7 depends upon whether such
probabilityis revealed by surrounding circumstances.") (emphasis added).
90. Responding to comments regarding the prop'osed final judgment in Gillette,
the Justice Department relied on the absence of special circumstances under MGM to
justify its refusal to require Gillette to give up its debt position in Eemland. Gillette I,
supranote 4, at 28,323.
91. 591 F. Supp. 859, 859 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 862.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 867.
96. Id. at 865. In addition to its loan to Chem-Clear, WMI also had ties to two
other waste disposal service companies in the same geographic area. This Article
focuses on Chem-Clear, because "WMI's only present interest in Chem-Clear is that
Chem-Clear owes WMI approximately $140,000." Id.at 862 (emphasis added).
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triable issues of fact.97 The court held that "WMI's status as a
substantial creditor could give it appreciable power over Chem-Clear's
actions."9 8 The court focused solely on the corporate control dimension
of the relationship. "If... Mr. Frank is able to prove that WMI's
creditor's interest gives WMI significant control over Chem-Clear, then
that interest would be a 'contemporary violation' of the Clayton Act." 99
Three factors surrounding the loan influenced the court's reasoning, the
fact (i) that Chem-Clear was "in financial straits," (ii) that the loan was
"substantial," and (iii) that "WMI did not press for collection while it
and Chem-Clear negotiated WMI's proposed takeover of Chem-Clear,"
i.e., the existence of a relationship between the parties beyond the
loan. '0
These factors also appear in the MGM court's list of
"surrounding circumstances," which is significant because there is no
indication that the Mr. Frankcourt was aware of the MGM decision.' 0 '
The Mr. Frank opinion contains an important discussion of the
applicability of §7 to debt investments, a logical prerequisite for the
analysis, which is missing entirely in the MGM decision where the court
simply assumed that debt investments fall within the scope of §7.102 In
Mr. Frank, the court addressed the issue of §7 applicability in the
context of determining whether a loan constitutes an "asset" under §7103
and held that "Chem-Clear's $140,000 debt to WMI may constitute
an... 'asset' because Chem-Clear is in financial straits."' 0 4 It follows e
contrariothat but for Chem-Clear's dire financial situation, the debt as
such would not have been an asset and not be subject to §7 scrutiny.
Thus, only qualified debt, i.e., debt in connection with other
circumstances that give the creditor "appreciable power over [the
debtor's] actions" ' 5 constitutes an asset, the acquisition of which may

97. See id. at 871 (holding that defendants motion for summary judgment was
denied in all aspects except those concerning divestiture and price fixing allegations).
98. Id. at 867.
99.

Id.

100. Id. at 862.
101. The Mr. Frankdecision contains no reference to MGM.
102. MGM, Inc., 303 F. Supp. at 1350.
103. Mr. Frank,Inc., 591 F. Supp. at 866 (stating that "[Assets] is not a word of art,
nor is it given a built-in definition by statute .... As used in this statute, and depending
upon the factual context, 'assets' may mean anything of value.").
104. Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
105. Id.

632

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. IX

be analyzed under §7.106 The court appears to have employed the
following analytical framework: As a rule, debt investments are
analyzed under §1, because debt as such is not an asset for purposes of
§7.107 However, in rare circumstances where the debt investment is
qualified by giving the creditor "appreciable power over [the debtor's]
actions," debt falls within the definition of an asset and §7 is
applicable.'
That analysis is appealing, because its rule/exception
character reflects the different effects of debt investments and partial
ownership.
In a partial ownership situation, the potential effects
standard of §7 is the rule, unless the investment is in fact competitively
harmless, in which case the actual effects standard of the "solely for
investment" exemption, which is substantively identical to that of §1,
applies.'0 9 In a debt investment situation, the rule/exception relationship
is reversed. The actual effects standard of § 1 is the rule, unless the
investment is of a narrowly defined type that confers meaningful
corporate control to the competing lender, which justifies the application
of §7's potential effects standard. Thus, Mr. Frank stands for the
proposition that debt investments in competitors, unless they convey a
meaningful degree of corporate control over the target to the investor,
fall outside of the scope of §7.

106. See id. at 866.
107. See id. at 867.
108. Id.
109. See U.S. v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979):
An acquisition may escape a challenge under Section 7, even though it may be in
violation of the section's substantive provisions, if it falls within the specific
exemptions provided for in Section 7, one of which provides that acquisitions of stock
where the acquisition is made solely for the purposes of investment are not included in
the prohibition of Section 7.
Id. at 1098; The Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975):
In cases where the "solely for investment" exemption does not apply, a plaintiff need
only show a reasonable probability of a lessening of competition ....
[However,
o]nce it is established to the satisfaction of the Court that the acquisition is "solely for
investment," the statute requires a showing that the defendant is "using the (stock) by
voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial
lessening of competition."
Id. at 1219.
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C. Vantico v. Apollo (2003)"0
Apollo Management LP ("Apollo"), a private equity fund
management company, acquired 35% of Vantico's senior bank debt at a
substantial discount to par through one of its funds (Fund V)."' Another
fund, Fund IV, held a controlling equity stake in Resolution
Performance Products, LLC ("Resolution"), a competitor of Vantico.
Vantico sued to enjoin Apollo from purchasing more debt and from
voting its debt against a restructuring plan that was proposed by a major
subordinated bondholder." 2 The district court denied the injunction,
finding that the acquisition of debt by Apollo did not violate §7, § 1, or
§2.' 13 Following MGM, the court implicitly assumed the applicability of
§7 to debt and started its analysis with the observation that "[t]he mere
fact that a company's horizontal competitor may have acquired the debt
of the company and is a creditor is not a sufficient basis to conclude that
such an acquisition is a violation of §7."' 14 Even though Vantico claimed
to be on the brink of insolvency, the court found that the "circumstances
created by the acquisition... does [sic] not establish a probability of
anti-competitive effects.""' 5 The court arrived at that result after a
careful analysis of Apollo's incentives as a fund manager." 6 Unlike a
holding company that serves the interests of one shareholder
constituency (i.e., the shareholders in the holding), a fund manager
serves the interests of multiple constituencies; in Apollo's case those of
the investors in Fund V (debt in Vantico) and Fund IV (equity in
Resolution)." 7 While a holding company might have an incentive to
consider anticompetitive trade-offs between investments, a fund
manager generally does not." 8
[W]hile the insolvency of a competitor might be of some benefit to
the investors in Fund IV, which controls Resolution, it would
110. Vantico Holdings, S.A. v. Apollo Mgmt. Ltd. P'ship, 247 F. Supp. 2d 437
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
111. Id. at 442-43, 447.
112. The bondholder was in fact funding the litigation. Id. at 446, 458.
113. Id. at 457-58.
114. Id. at 455.
115. Id. at456.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 442-43.
118. Id. at 456.
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significantly harm the investors in Fund V, and risk the
recoverability of Fund V's $160 million investment [in Vantico.]
Consequently, Apollo has little or no.incentive
to engage
in the anti•
119

competitive behavior that is envisioned by Vantico.

The Vantico case is significant because the court made the financial

1 20
incentives analysis of the investor the centerpiece of its opinion.
Because Apollo, as a fund manager, had no incentives to harm Vantico,
there was no likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition.'2' The
court's reliance on the incentive analysis, however, narrows the
applicability of Vantico as precedent in the context of debt investments.
The court did not decide whether the acquisition of Vantico's debt by
Resolution (Vantico's competitor) would have violated §7. To the
contrary, the court explained that Apollo, even though it controlled
Resolution, was in fact not Vantico's competitor and would not "be
likely to pressure Vantico in Vantico's competitive business decisions.
Apollo's interest in Vantico is a creditor's interest in assuring that the
value of Apollo's debt is protected and that any increase in the value of
the debt can be realized."' 22 Thus, arguably, Vantico is at its core a case
of debt investment in a non-competitor and may only be tangentially
related to the issues raised in MGM and Mr. Frank.

IV. CONCLUSION

The competitive effects of debt investments differ significantly
from those of partial ownership in all three relevant dimensions,
financial interest, corporate control, and access to competitively
sensitive information.
With respect to financial interest, debt
investments are much less likely to lessen competition, because debt,
unlike partial ownership, does not reduce the investor's incentives to
compete at the margin. 23 With respect to corporate control and
information exchange, the degree of the creditor's influence depends on

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. 456-57 ("Vantico has not shown that the acquisition of 35% of
Vantico's senior debt by Apollo has created the probability of anticompetitive effects
and unlawful restraints of trade prohibited by the Clayton Act.").
122. Id. at 456.
123. See supra Part II.C.
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the borrower's refinancing options. As long as the debtor has practical
refinancing alternatives, the creditor's influence over the debtor's
management and its access to competitively sensitive information is
limited to the cost of refinancing. 2 4 Thus, debt investments in solvent
competitors are presumably efficient and are not likely to significantly
lessen competition or unreasonably restrain trade. 25 However, once the
debtor's financial situation deteriorates and the refinancing costs
124. See supra Part II.B.
Whether the rule of reason analysis is carried out under §1 or §7 is only of
125.
secondary concern here. It has been held and argued that the substantive standards of
§1 and §7 have converged. U.S. v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1281-83
(7th Cir. 1990); Vantico Holdings, S.A. v. Apollo Mgmt. Ltd. P'ship, 247 F. Supp. 2d
437, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 4 PHILIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW, 906 (rev. ed.,
2002). Older case law and recent commentary suggest, however, that the incipiency
standard of §7 is easier to meet (at least on an evidentiary basis) than the actual injury
standard of §1. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381
U.S. 311, 323 (1965); U.S. v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 161, 170-71 (1964);
Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v.
F.T.C., 296 F.2d 800, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1961); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F.
Supp. 177, 183 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'dper curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); Am.
Crystal Sugar Co., 259 F.2d at 527 (2d Cir. 1958); 4 EARL KINTNER, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW § 35.8, at 197 (1984); O'Brien & Salop, Competitive Effects, supra
note 5, at 565; Phillip Proger, Application of the Sherman Act to Health Care: New
Developments and New Directions, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 182 (1990). If one were to
adopt the latter position, then there is a strong systematic argument for the exclusive
application of § 1 to debt investments. Unlike equity investments, debt investments are
not significantly correlated with competitive effects. That correlation, however, is the
justification for applying the incipiency standard to acquisitions of stock and assets.
Notably, Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2004), which requires premerger notification of certain acquisitions of voting securities and assets to the Federal
Government, specifically exempts "acquisitions of bonds, mortgages, deeds of trust, or
other obligations which are not voting securities" from the notification requirement. 15
U.S.C. § 18a (c)(2). The rationale for the exemption is that the acquisition of bonds and
other obligations is not sufficiently likely to cause competitive effects as to warrant
advance warning. Moreover, if the acquisition of debt was treated as an asset
acquisition, the conspicuous omission of "assets" from the language of the "solely for
investment" exemption in §7 strongly suggests that the exemption would not be
available to an acquisition of debt. Consequently, §7 would be even more broadly
applicable to debt investments than to equity investments, which is a systematically
unsatisfactory result. Here, the framework underlying Mr. Frank might offer a
compromise solution: As a rule, debt investments come under the actual injury standard
of § I unless they confer control over the target, in which case §7 applies. See supra Part
III.B.
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increase, the creditor's de facto influence increases. 126 Where the
creditor can unilaterally accelerate the loan and drive the debtor into
bankruptcy, the creditor may have greater influence over the borrower's
management (and access to its competitively sensitive information) than
a comparable shareholder. 2 7 However, as debt investments do not
meaningfully alter the creditor's competitive incentives, the creditorunlike the partial owner-is in a position to eliminate potential concerns
from its investment in a financially troubled competitor by making the
loan passive, e.g., by implementing undertakings similar to those in
Gillette,128 or, in the case of a syndicated loan, by voting its debt
proportionally with the other, non-competing lenders, and/or by agreeing
to only receive information that does not contain any competitively
sensitive information.
With these qualifications in mind, debt
investments in competitors should receive deferential treatment under
the antitrust laws.

126. See supra Part II.B.
127.
Desirable as controlling the target may be from a competitor's perspective,
influencing a flailing borrower's strategic business decisions is a dangerous practice
from a creditor's point of view. See MANNINO, supra, note 59, § 2.02 [1] ("In the
lender's lexicon, control is a very dangerous word. Control theories may lead to
holding the lender liable for the borrower's contract, or even tort, liabilities, or to
subordinating the lender's loan to debts owed to other creditors."). Depending on the
circumstances of the case, the liability risk from controlling the debtor might outweigh
the expected gains from influencing the debtor's management and serve as a deterrent
to exercising control.
128. See supra note 72.

